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Executive Summary 
 
We welcome General Comment No. 5 which is an important evolution in the concept of 
equality. However, we believe it can be significantly clarified and strengthened in four 
main ways.  
 
First, the meaning of equality should be clearly defined and consistently applied. We 
recommend that a four dimensional evaluative framework be incorporated.1 This would 
give clarity and strength to the conception of transformative equality frequently referred 
to but not defined in the General Comment. This conception requires that, to achieve 
transformative equality, measures must (i) redress the social and economic 
disadvantage associated with disability; (ii) address stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and 
violence on the basis of disability; (iii) enhance participation and voice of people with 
disabilities and (iv) accommodate difference by achieving structural change. These 
dimensions need to be considered simultaneously in evaluating whether a measure 
advances equality. Such a conception would give states clearer guidance and enable 
the Committee to evaluate state performance in a consistent manner.  
 
Secondly, specific measures should be regarded as an essential element of 
transformative equality rather than an exception. This means that specific measures 
should constitute a mandatory positive obligation on states. Furthermore, to fully 
address the structural and systemic nature of discrimination that persons with 
disabilities experience, specific measures should be designed to address the four 
dimensions of transformative equality. First, such measures should redistribute 
material resources, including jobs, education, skills development and training. Second, 
they should dismantle stereotypes, stigma and prejudice; prevent and redress violence; 
and positively affirm the dignity and equal worth of persons with disabilities. Thirdly, 
they should ensure that persons with disabilities are involved in all decisions affecting 
them. Fourth, they should render participation in social life and institutions an actual 
realisable possibility through structural and systematic change, including reasonable 
accommodation and access obligations.  
 
Thirdly, we recommend the adoption of a clearer definition of intersectional 
discrimination for the purposes of Article 5(2). Inspired by the work of the CEDAW 
committee, we recommend that the current definition in paragraph 20(e) of the General 
Comment be replaced by: ‘Intersectional discrimination, which occurs when persons 
with disabilities suffer discrimination in any form, including direct and indirect 
discrimination, denial of reasonable accommodation, and harassment, on the basis of 
disability combined with race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national, ethnic, indigenous or social origin, property, birth, age or other status.’ This 
definition conveys the synergistic nature of intersectional discrimination; eliminates the 
confusing references to grounds/characteristics/life circumstances and identities; and 
provides for a list of grounds which is consistent with other references in the General 
Comment while remaining open ended. We further recommend that the separate 
definition of ‘multiple discrimination’ be removed, as it is subsumed into the broader 
                                            
 
 
1 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law 2nd ed (Claredon, 2011) 18; Sandra Fredman, 
‘Substantive Equality Revisited’ (2016) 14(3) Int’l J of Con L 712; 
  
 
Page 4 
definition recommended above. Finally, we recommend twin-tracking references to 
intersectional discrimination in relation to specific measures, remedies and 
disaggregated data.  
 
Fourthly, we recommend that the General Comment stress that reasonable 
accommodation and undue burden be assessed from the perspective of persons with 
disabilities. We further recommend that the General Comment remind states that, in 
calculating reasonable accommodation and undue burden, appropriate weight be given 
to the impact of not accommodating persons with disabilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Page 5 
Transformative Equality  
Equality is a complex and contested concept. It is crucial that the CRPD 
Committee provide guidance on the meaning of equality that is clear, 
consistent, easy for states to apply, and for the Committee to draw on in its 
Concluding Observations and at the same time, nuanced and sophisticated. 
The General Comment is a significant evolution in the concept of equality at 
international human rights law, notably in explicitly embracing transformative 
equality. However, there remain areas of the General Comment that are 
underdeveloped; risk generating confusion; or being misinterpreted by the 
states.  
I. Beyond Equality of Opportunity 
 
Paragraphs 9 and 10 refer to equality of opportunities and describe it as a 
‘fundamental concept’. We submit that providing equality of opportunities on its 
own is not, however, able to fully break cycles of disadvantage experienced by 
persons with disabilities.2 This is because in practice equality of opportunity has 
been used procedurally rather than substantively, for example, to remove word-
of-mouth job recruitment. It has rarely been used to ensure that persons with 
disabilities have the education, support and skills to achieve success in the 
labour market.  
 
Although equality of opportunity is referred to in the CRPD, to avoid confusion, 
we submit that the General Comment needs to make explicit that equality of 
opportunity is but one link in achieving a larger understanding of equality, and 
that it has now given way to a more finely calibrated model.3  
 
We recommend the following addition to paragraph 10:  
 
This definition of equalization of opportunities marks a 
significant development from a formal model of equality to 
a substantive model of equality. The concept of equality 
in the CPRD, however, goes beyond equality of 
opportunity. 
 
Similarly, paragraph 18 conflates equality of opportunity and transformative 
equality. We recommend that reference to equality of opportunity in 
paragraph 18 should be removed and replaced with transformative 
equality.   
                                            
 
 
2 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law 2nd ed (Claredon, 2011) 18.  
3 Sandra Fredman, ‘Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality: Towards a New 
Definition of Equal Rights’ in I. Boerefijn et al, eds, Temporary Special Measures (Intersentia, 
2003). 
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II. Meaning of Transformative Equality 
 
The General Comment embraces transformative equality but fails to provide a 
coherent definition of the term. Without a clear definition, the General Comment 
provides insufficient guidance to states on the fulfilment of their obligations 
under the CRPD, or for the Committee to use in evaluating state compliance in 
its Concluding Observations. Furthermore, without squarely engaging with the 
meaning of transformative equality, the Committee misses an opportunity to 
make a landmark contribution to international human rights law.   
 
We recommend that the Committee explicitly adopt Fredman’s four 
dimensional model of transformative equality.4 This model comprehensively 
and harmoniously synthesizes many of the elements of equality that are 
referred to in the General Comment. It pursues four-overlapping 
dimensions:  
 
• redressing the social and economic disadvantage associated with 
disability;  
 
• addressing stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and violence;  
 
• enhancing participation; and 
 
• accommodating difference by achieving structural change 
 
The first dimension requires specific measures to address the social and 
economic disadvantage associated with disability, including a comprehensive 
social welfare scheme. Equal treatment is clearly not sufficient. The second 
element addresses recognition harms such as: harassment, violence, prejudice, 
stereotypes, stigmas, negative cultural attitudes, indignity and humiliation. Third, 
the participation dimension requires inclusionof people with disabilities in all 
public, private, political and social decision making processes. Fourth, the 
structural dimension requires institutions rather than individuals to change.5  
 
These dimensions need to be considered simultaneously in evaluating whether 
a measure advances equality. For example, treating people with disabilities as 
welfare beneficiaries might address material disadvantage among persons with 
disabilities but reinforce negative stereotypes and perpetuate relations of 
dependency. Applying the first and second dimensions simultaneously requires 
states to model social benefits on the basis that persons with disabilities are 
rights-holders and agents, so that disadvantage can be redressed without 
                                            
 
 
4 Sandra Fredman, ‘Substantive Equality Revisited’ (2016) 14(3) Int’l J of Con L 712. 
5 Sandra Fredman and Beth Goldblatt, ‘Discussion Paper: Gender Equality and Human Rights’ 
(2014) UN Women, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UTSLRS/2014/8.pdf.  
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perpetuating stigma and stereotyping. The participation dimension in turn 
requires persons with disabilities to be involved in decisions that affect them, a 
central tenet of the CRPD. Similarly, duties of accommodation should be 
formulated in ways which incorporate the other dimensions, particularly avoiding 
stereotyping and insisting on participation. Duties of accommodation should 
also move beyond individual exceptions and include structural change. In this 
way, the dimensions enrich each other to arrive at a more in-depth analysis. 
III. Transformative Equality as a Monitoring Framework 
A preponderance of rights in the CRPD are guaranteed on the ‘basis of 
equality’. In the treaty, therefore, equality is a right, a principle and the test to 
determine if the state has fulfilled its obligations. The Committee needs to 
develop tools to monitor if the state has fulfilled its obligations on the basis of 
equality. None of the treaty bodies have reflected on how best to monitor the 
implementation of rights on the basis of equality.6  This is another opportunity 
for the Committee to break new ground and is a further compelling reason for 
adopting Fredman’s four-dimensional model of equality.7 This model offers an 
evaluative framework and criteria ‘to determine whether a law, policy, practice 
or institution is likely to fulfill the right to equality and points to ways in which 
they should be reformed better to do so.’8  
 
Achieving equality for persons with disabilities is challenging. It can be difficult 
to detect inequalities; and measures that on the surface appear to enhance 
equality might in practice reinforce inequalities. The strength of the four 
dimensional model is its ability to grapple with these complexities. It offers an 
easy to use but rigorous framework for states on how to develop laws, policies 
and programmes that achieve transformative equality for persons with 
disabilities. This is imperative in providing guidance to states in how to translate 
the open-textured obligations in the CRPD to the state’s unique legal, political, 
economic and cultural context and in crafting tailored recommendations for 
states in the Committee’s Concluding Observations.    
                                            
 
 
6 Meghan Campbell, ‘Women’s Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women: Unlocking the Potential of the Optional Protocol’ (2016) 34(4) Nordic Journal of 
Human Rights 242. 
7 Meghan Campbell, ‘Monitoring Women’s Socio-Economic Equality Under ICESCR’ (2018) 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law (forthcoming).  
8Sandra Fredman, ‘Substantive Equality Revisited’ (2016) 14(3) Int’l J of Con L 712, 713. 
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Specific Measures: A Facet of Transformative Equality  
 
We submit that paras 29 and 30 of the General Comment, that describe specific 
measures, are inadequate. A stronger statement on specific measures is 
required, making their provision a mandatory positive obligation on states. In 
order to achieve transformative equality, it is not enough to require specific 
measures only in exceptional cases.  
 
Specific measures are provided for in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the General 
Comment. It states that specific measures ‘are generally not mandatory’ and 
are ‘required’ only when they are ‘deemed necessary to accelerate or achieve 
de facto equality.’  
 
Under a transformative approach to equality as adopted by the Committee, and 
understood as submitted in our recommendations above, we submit that 
specific measures are a necessary component of realising transformative 
equality for persons with disabilities.  
 
We submit that it is not enough for the Committee to simply assert that the 
adoption of specific measures does not constitute discrimination. The 
Committee must support an interpretation of specific measures that is 
consistent with and illustrative of the four dimensions of transformative equality 
explained above. The provision of specific measures must thus be considered 
to play a necessary role in the achievement of the four dimensions of 
transformative equality. In order to support our proposition, we submit that the 
Canadian and South African courts have interpreted equality to include, as a 
necessary component thereof, specific measures.   
 
In the South African Constitutional Court case of Minister of Finance and Other 
v Van Heerden, the Court held, referring to specific measures under section 
9(2) of the Constitution, that ‘absent a positive commitment progressively to 
eradicate socially constructed barriers to equality and to root out systematic or 
institutionalised under-privilege, the constitutional promise of equality before the 
law and its equal protection and benefit must, in the context of our country, ring 
hollow.’9 Similarly, the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Kapp, found that the 
prohibition of discrimination in section 15(1) and the provision for ameliorative 
                                            
 
 
9 Minister of Finance and Others v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) [31]. See also the four 
dimensional approach in the South African context: Catherine Albertyn and Sandra Fredman, 
Acta Juridica – ‘Equality Beyond Dignity: Multi-dimensional Equality and Justice Langa's 
Judgments: part III: Reflections on Themes in Justice Langa's Judgments’ (2015) 2015 (1) Acta 
Juridica 430. 
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measures in section 15(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
‘work together to promote the vision of substantive equality’.10 Essentially, in 
addition to acknowledging specific measures as a legitimate means to 
achieving equality, the Committee must make it clear that the adoption of 
specific measures constitute a substantive and composite part of the guarantee 
of equality for persons with disabilities. 
 
While the South African and Canadian interpretations of equality, particularly 
the meaning of ‘equal protection and equal benefit of the law’, are not decisive 
or binding on the Committee, we submit that these approaches should be taken 
as persuasive in interpreting the scope of transformative equality. We provide 
two reasons in support of our submission. First, as noted by the Committee,11 
the drafting history of the CRPD reveals that, like the South African and 
Canadian approaches, the provisions in Articles 5(1)-(4) embody a substantive 
and transformative rather than a formal view of equality. Secondly, the text in 
both the Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms12 and the 
South African Constitution13 use the same language of equal protection and 
equal benefit of the law, as of that in the Article 5(1) of the CRPD. Indeed, as 
noted by the Committee, the Canadian provision influenced the drafting of the 
equality provision in the CRPD. The Canadian provision also influenced the 
drafting of the South African Constitution’s guarantee of the right to equality.  
 
We further submit that it is inadequate for the General Comment to simply 
identify a category of exceptional cases wherein specific measures are 
‘required’ or ‘deemed necessary’. The Committee must bear in mind the deeply 
embedded structural and systemic ways in which persons with disabilities have 
been discriminated against and in doing so, articulate a stronger position in 
relation to the protection and advancement of equality of persons with 
disabilities. 
 
Finally, the scope of the current category of exceptions is vague and open to 
abuse. It is highly likely that states will invariably argue that specific measures 
are not strictly ‘necessary’ for the achievement of transformative equality, and 
that the ‘essence’ of the protection of a human right was not threatened by the 
failure to provide for such measures.  
                                            
 
 
10 R v Kapp [2008] 2 SCR 483 [16].  
11 Committee, Draft General Comment No. 5 [19]. 
12 Section 15(1) of The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Every individual is equal 
before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law 
without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.  
13 Section 9 of the South African Constitution: (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the 
right to equal protection and benefit of the law; (2) Equality includes the full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and 
other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
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In light of the above submissions, we recommend that paragraph 30 be 
replaced by:  
 
Specific measures are necessary for the 
achievement of transformative equality. States 
should adopt temporary or permanent specific 
measures under Article 5 (4) of the CRPD to ensure 
that the right to equality of persons with 
disabilities is realised. A failure to do so could 
render the right to equality a mere formal 
guarantee, without substantive and transformative 
effect.  
 
Specific measures are necessary to address the 
structural and systemic nature of discrimination 
that persons with disabilities experience. To do 
this however, these measures must be designed to 
address the four dimensions of transformative 
equality. First, such measures should redistribute 
material resources, including jobs, education, 
skills development and training. Second, they 
should dismantle stereotypes, stigma and 
prejudice; prevent and redress violence; and 
positively affirm the dignity and equal worth of 
persons with disabilities. Thirdly, they should 
ensure that persons with disabilities are involved 
in all decisions affecting them. Fourth, they should 
render participation in social life and institutions 
an actual realisable possibility through structural 
and systematic change, including reasonable 
accommodation and access obligations.  
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Intersectional Discrimination  
 
We recommend the adoption of a clearer definition of intersectional 
discrimination for the purposes of Article 5(2), and suggest two principal 
amendments to the General Comment in this regard, to the meaning of 
intersectional discrimination and for twin-tracking intersectional discrimination.   
I. The Meaning of ‘Intersectional Discrimination’ 
 
The current definition at paragraph 20(e) of the General Comment provides 
that: ‘Intersectional discrimination when a person having a status or a 
characteristic associated with one or more prohibited grounds is discriminated 
on several prohibited grounds or statuses. Intersectional discrimination can 
appear as direct or indirect discrimination, denial of reasonable accommodation 
and as harassment.’ 
 
We submit that this definition is vague and unclear. It uses too many 
unexplained terms such as statuses, characteristics, and grounds; elsewhere 
the General Comment uses ‘life circumstances’ and ‘identities’ to define 
intersectional discrimination. It also does not link intersectional discrimination to 
disability which is important in the present context. 
 
We recommend that the current definition be replaced by:  
 
‘Intersectional discrimination, which occurs when 
persons with disabilities suffer discrimination in 
any form, including direct and indirect 
discrimination, denial of reasonable 
accommodation, and harassment, on the basis of 
disability combined with race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national, ethnic, indigenous or social origin, 
property, birth, age or other status.’ 
 
This definition is inspired by the work of the CEDAW Committee which is at the 
forefront of recognising intersectional discrimination in international human 
rights law.14 We think that this definition is more accessible for five reasons. 
First, the operative word in this definition is ‘combined’ which neatly explains the 
                                            
 
 
14 The CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations’ (2010) 
CEDAW/C/GC/28 [18]. Followed in: The CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 
34 on Rights of Rural Women’ (2016) CEDAW/C/GC/34 [14] [15]; The CEDAW Committee, 
‘General Recommendation No. 35 on Gender-based Violence against Women; (2017) 
CEDAW/C/GC/25 [12] [23] [28] [37b] [41] [43] [48] [49] [50]]. 
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nature of intersectional discrimination by conveying that intersectional 
discrimination based on two or more grounds is inextricably synergistic and 
hence cannot be separated out into discrimination based on each ground 
individually.15 Secondly, the definition eliminates confusing references to 
grounds/statuses/characteristics/life circumstances/identities.16 Thirdly, the 
grounds listed in this definition are consistent with the grounds listed in the 
CRPD in preamble paragraph (p) while ultimately being open-ended (‘or other 
status’). Fourthly, the definition corresponds with the definitions of direct, 
indirect, denial of reasonable accommodation and harassment in paragraphs 
20(a)-(d). Fifthly, it establishes the connection with intersectional discrimination 
and other forms of discrimination in a seamless way.17  
II. Intersectional Discrimination is Distinct from Multiple Discrimination   
 
The distinction between multiple and intersectional discrimination as proposed 
in the General Comment in paragraph 22(1) is vague and confusing. We urge 
the Committee to remove the separate definition of ‘multiple discrimination’ and 
adopt a single phrase and definition of ‘intersectional discrimination’, for 
consistency and clarity.  
 
The distinction between multiple and intersectional discrimination is artificial and 
conceptually ill-advised. On one hand, multiple discrimination assumes that 
persons with disabilities can face multiple discrimination based on several 
grounds in a way such that discrimination can be separated out into individual 
grounds. This gives the impression that where two or more grounds are 
involved, discrimination can potentially be divided up based on each ground 
separately to establish discrimination. On the other hand, intersectional 
discrimination is ‘inseparable’. The concept of intersectionality and 
intersectional discrimination fundamentally opposes the notion of multiple 
discrimination adopted in the General Comment.18 
 
                                            
 
 
15 See also an illustration of this concept in the context of gender violence, Shreya Atrey, ‘Lifting 
as We Climb: Recognising Intersectional Gender Violence in Law’ (2015) 5(6) Oñati Socio-
Legal Series. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2709972  
16 Meghan Campbell, ‘CEDAW and Women’s Intersecting Identities: A Pioneering Approach to 
Intersectionality’ (2015) Revista Diretio GV 479. 
17 For instance, in the EU context, see Sandra Fredman, ‘Intersectional Discrimination in EU 
gender equality and non-discrimination law, Report for the European Network of legal experts in 
gender equality and non-discrimination’ (2016) European Commission 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/document/files/intersectionality.pdf 
18 Shreya Atrey, ‘Fifty years On: The Curious Case of Intersectional Discrimination in the 
ICCPR’ (2017) 35(3) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 220. 
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Although there is reference to multiple discrimination in the preamble and has 
been used in relation to discrimination against women with disabilities,19 this is 
no bar in now dropping the reference to multiple discrimination and adopting the 
more inclusive and broader understanding of intersectional discrimination. The 
CEDAW Committee has done just this: its current view on intersectional 
discrimination having developed from earlier references to multiple 
discrimination to the more nuanced intersectional discrimination now. Since 
adopting the more sophisticated explanation of intersectionality and 
intersectional discrimination in General Recommendation No. 28, the CEDAW 
Committee has dropped the reference to multiple discrimination all together. 
This is most noticeable in the updated General Recommendation No. 35 on 
violence against women which only uses the terms ‘intersectional 
discrimination’ and ‘intersecting forms of discrimination’. We suggest that the 
CRPD Committee also adopt this approach.  
 
We recommend the deletion of references to ‘multiple’ discrimination at 
these points and retaining only ‘intersectional discrimination’: paragraphs 
3, 10, 22, 33, 38, 41, 42, 44, 73(c), 73 (l) of the General Comment.  
 
III. Twin-Tracking Intersectional Discrimination  
  
In addition to the two principal amendments suggested above, we recommend 
twin-tracking the reference to intersectional discrimination at these relevant 
points: 
 (i) Specific Measures Under Article 5(4) 
 
In paragraph 28, include reference to intersectional discrimination in 
addition to structural and systemic discrimination.  
 
In paragraph 37, recommend that states identify subgroups of persons 
with disabilities that need specific measures to accelerate or achieve 
transformative equality, including those who suffer from intersectional 
discrimination.  
 
                                            
 
 
19 The Committee, ‘General Comment No. 3 on Article 6 Girls and Women with Disabilities’ 
(2016) CRPD/C/GC/3.  
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(ii) Remedies 
 
At paragraph 23 and paragraph 76(h), recommend that the state provide 
for appropriate and effective remedies in relation to intersectional 
discrimination. This is keeping in mind general remedies for disability 
discrimination will be inadequate for and different from disability discrimination 
which is intersectional in nature.  
(iii) Disaggregate Data  
In paragraph 76(k), recommend that data in relation to inclusive equality 
policies be disaggregated further on the basis of ‘race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic, indigenous 
or social origin, property, birth, age or other status’. 
 
In paragraph 75, recommend that data be disaggregated on the basis of 
‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, 
ethnic, indigenous or social origin, property, birth, age or other status’. 
The Committee must adopt a single consistent open-ended list of grounds 
rather than a variable list which appears in the General Comments at different 
places.  
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Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Burden 
 
The General Comment appropriately identifies the duty of reasonable 
accommodation and emphasises its importance in giving effect to the CRPD.  
 
The General Comment recognises at paragraph 25 that reasonable 
accommodation must be ‘negotiated with the individual person with a disability 
concerned’ and that the choices of the individual must be taken into account. It 
further notes that ‘reasonable’ should be understood as relating to effectiveness 
(paragraph 26). We recommend that it be made clear, by adding a further 
factor to paragraph 27, that whether an accommodation is effective so as 
to render it reasonable must be assessed from the perspective of the 
individual person with disability concerned.  
 
This section of the General Comment further discusses the concept of 
disproportionate or undue burden. Paragraph 27(b) confirms that cost is a factor 
in determining whether an accommodation would impose a disproportionate or 
undue burden, but not a factor in determining whether the accommodation is 
reasonable. It is unclear in paragraph 27(e) where it identifies a set of ‘potential 
factors’ whether these factors relate to reasonableness or to whether a 
disproportionate or undue burden is imposed. We recommend clarifying that 
the factors in paragraph 27(e) relate to disproportionate or undue burden 
and not to reasonableness.  
 
In considering whether a disproportionate or undue burden is imposed, in 
individual cases, it is important to reiterate that it is these public authorities and 
institutions and private persons, organisations or enterprises on whom the duty 
to provide reasonable accommodation rests. In assessing whether reasonable 
accommodation imposes a disproportionate or undue burden, the relative 
positions of these parties must be borne in mind. In individual cases, even if the 
reasonable accommodation would impose a significant burden on the duty 
bearer, such as a public authority or private enterprise, the burden may still not 
be disproportionate or undue when assessed in light of the burden that it would 
constitute for the individual person with disability. We recommend adding this 
explanation to paragraph 27: 
 
State parties have obligations to ensure that public 
authorities and institutions do not discriminate and to 
take appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
on the basis of disability by any person, organisation or 
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private enterprise.20 In individual cases, it is these 
public authorities and institutions and private persons, 
organisations or enterprises on whom the duty to 
provide reasonable accommodation rests. In assessing 
whether reasonable accommodation imposes a 
disproportionate or undue burden, the relative 
positions of these parties must be borne in mind. Even 
if the reasonable accommodation would impose a 
significant burden on the duty bearer, the burden may 
still not be disproportionate or undue when assessed in 
light of the burden that it would constitute for the 
individual person with disability. 
 
 
                                            
 
 
20 Article 4(d) and (e) of the CRPD.  
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Recommendations  
 
We recommend:  
1. After the first sentence, in the paragraph 10, that the Committee 
adds the sentence: The concept of equality in the CPRD, however, 
goes beyond equality of opportunity. 
 
2. Remove ‘equality of opportunity’ and replace it with transformative 
equality in paragraph 18. 
 
3. Define transformative equality as including the four dimensions: (i) 
redressing disadvantage; (ii) addressing stigma, stereotyping, 
prejudice and violence on the basis of disability; (iii) enhancing 
participation and voice of people with disabilities and (iv) 
accommodating difference by achieving structural change. 
 
4. The four dimensions of transformative equality be employed as a 
monitoring device for the Concluding Observations and Individual 
Communications.  
 
5. That paragraph 30 be replaced with:   
 
Specific measures are necessary for the 
achievement of transformative equality. States 
should adopt temporary or permanent specific 
measures under Article 5 (4) of the CRPD to ensure 
that the right to equality of persons with 
disabilities is realised. A failure to do so could 
render the right to equality a mere formal 
guarantee, without substantive and transformative 
effect.  
 
Specific measures are necessary to address the 
structural and systemic nature of discrimination 
that persons with disabilities experience. To do 
this however, these measures must be designed to 
address the four dimensions of transformative 
equality. First, such measures should redistribute 
material resources, including jobs, education, 
skills development and training. Secondly, they 
should dismantle stereotypes, stigma and 
prejudice; prevent and redress violence; and 
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positively affirm the dignity and equal worth of 
persons with disabilities. Thirdly, they should 
ensure that persons with disabilities are involved 
in all decisions affecting them. Fourthly, they 
should render participation in social life and 
institutions an actual realisable possibility through 
structural and systematic change, including 
reasonable accommodation and access 
obligations.  
 
6. Intersectional discriminations should be defined as ‘Intersectional 
discrimination, which occurs when persons with disabilities suffer 
discrimination in any form, including direct and indirect 
discrimination, denial of reasonable accommodation, and 
harassment, on the basis of disability combined with race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic, 
indigenous or social origin, property, birth, age or other status.’ 
 
7. The deletion of references to ‘multiple’ discrimination at these 
points and retaining only ‘intersectional discrimination’: paragraphs 
3, 10, 22, 33, 38, 41, 42, 44, 73(c), 73 (l) of the General Comment.  
 
8. In paragraph 28, include reference to intersectional discrimination 
in addition to structural and systemic discrimination.  
 
9. In paragraph 37, recommend that states identify subgroups of 
persons with disabilities that need specific measures to accelerate 
or achieve transformative (inclusive) equality, including those who 
suffer from intersectional discrimination.  
 
10. Paragraph 23 and paragraph 76(h), recommend that the state 
provide for appropriate and effective remedies in relation to 
intersectional discrimination.  
 
11. Paragraph 75 and 76(k) include reference to intersectional 
discrimination and disaggregated data. 
 
12. The addition to paragraph 27 of a new paragraph 27(d) after the 
current paragraph 27(c) to read ‘Whether an accommodation is 
effective so as to render it reasonable must be assessed from the 
perspective of the individual person with disability concerned’. 
 
13. Adding to paragraph 27(e) after the words ‘Potential factors to be 
considered…’ the words ‘in assessing whether reasonable 
accommodation would impose a disproportionate or undue 
burden’. 
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14. Adding to the end of paragraph 27(e) a new paragraph to read: 
 
State parties have obligations to ensure that public 
authorities and institutions do not discriminate and 
to take appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination on the basis of disability by any 
person, organisation or private enterprise.21 In 
individual cases, it is these public authorities and 
institutions and private persons, organisations or 
enterprises on whom the duty to provide 
reasonable accommodation rests. In assessing 
whether reasonable accommodation imposes a 
disproportionate or undue burden, the relative 
positions of these parties must be borne in mind. 
Even if the reasonable accommodation would 
impose a significant burden on the duty bearer, the 
burden may still not be disproportionate or undue 
when assessed in light of the burden that it would 
constitute for the individual person with disability. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
 
21 Article 4(d) and (e) of the CRPD.  
